As a consequence of liberalization policies in the European Union (EU), a number of formerly inward-looking incumbents in telecommunications and
INTRODUCTION
It was only from the 1980s that the European Commission (EC) started to embark seriously on forging market integration in the network industries, particularly in telecommunications and electricity, despite the fact it had enjoyed significant legal competence in the field since the Treaty of Rome (Clifton et al. 2005) . The new, liberalized policy environment which extended over these two sectors substantially changed the business options available to incumbents. In particular, liberalization 'enabled' these previously inward-looking domestic incumbents to contemplate, and pursue, expansion abroad. As a consequence, dozens of incumbents -previously perceived by some as inefficient 'lame ducks' fit only for privatization -rapidly transformed into world class Multinational Corporations. Their emergence provided evidence of a new dawn of European 'international champions', this time not in the traditional industrial sectors (Hayward 1995) , but in the network industries since, though business reached many corners of the globe, the overwhelming bulk of investment was in other EU countries (Clifton et al. 2008) . Sectoral liberalization could be understood as a response to a concern that European business, including network industries, had to adapt to new technological and competitive challenges from the United States, Japan and beyond. Market integration in the network industries, it was anticipated, would produce a smaller number of more competitive firms better able to confront global challenges. From the 1990s, a significant number of these incumbents internationalized and now figure not only as some of Europe's but the world's largest Multinationals. Fifteen years earlier, none of these firms figured in the top 100 ranking.
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Given this development, it would appear that European policy-makers met with some success. Now, liberalization was a 'prerequisite' of incumbent internationalization.
Internationalization would not have been prioritised or even permitted when nationalized incumbents were domestic monopoly public service suppliers. However, the precise relationship between incumbents' internationalization and liberalization is contested. Tension has emerged around the perception that some incumbents embark on aggressive internationalization strategies in other countries which are relatively more exposed to liberalization -even daring to take over 'their' national 'jewel in the crown' -whilst the 'aggressors'' home governments delay liberalization in that sector. While this perception could generate disquiet in any industry, it is particularly alive in energy and communications, which have long been considered of strategic national interest. For successful market integration, it is essential that a level-playing field is created and that it is perceived that all players stick to the rules of the game. Hence, common liberalization deadlines are set, and the EC uses various disciplinary instruments to 'punish' non-compliers. In practice, the implementation of liberalization in different settings invariably differs. Political economists ascribe these differences to the various and multiple pressures States receive from different economic actors (Smith 2001; Thatcher 2001; Henisz and Zelner 2006) . Purposeful delay -or the perception of purposeful delay -could bring market integration to a stand-still ('why should we open up, if they aren't?'). 1 Thus, the question of States' and firms' responses to liberalization cuts to the heart of the political economy of the integration process. Building on scholarship on telecommunications and electricity reform (Börsch 2004 , Eising 2002 , Haar and Jones 2008 , Héritier 2002 , Murillo 2009 , Thatcher 2001 this article analyses the role of liberalization policy in explaining incumbent internationalization in telecommunications and electricity. Correlation and cluster methodology is deployed to analyse all major telecoms (12) and electricity (17) Multinationals in the EU plus Norway. After multiple rounds of liberalization, much work is left to be accomplished in telecommunications and, particularly, electricity, before market integration is complete (Ilzkovitz et al., 2008) . In July 2009, the EC ruled E.ON and Gaz de France-Suez had participated in 'market sharing'. Previously, in 2007, the EC ruled Telefónica had set unfair prices. There are, of course, many other less publicised cases.
Deeper insight into the role played by liberalization policy in incumbent internationalization can shed new light on the political economy of market integration.
We find no causal relationship between incumbent internationalization and liberalization. Liberalization and internationalization changed the opportunity sets available for incumbents and their governments, but 'policy space' matters. Some larger players aggressively 'swallowed up' smaller or less-convinced market players, in a West-East, North-South direction. Diversity is encountered, at the country, sectoral and, particularly, firm level. Decisions taken inside policy space can have long-lasting consequences on the ways in which the economy is structured.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section two presents the three main arguments on the relationship between incumbent internationalization and liberalization and derives the hypotheses. Section three and four presents data on incumbent internationalization and the analysis respectively. Conclusions follow. The third hypothesis is derived from comparative political economy (Hall and Soskice 2001) and its application to sectoral reform (Börsch 2004 , Levi-Faur 2006 , Murillo 2009 , Thatcher and Héritier 2002 . The most nuanced account uses a 'policy analysis' approach to argue that different paths to reform -explained by institutional differencesmay lead to relatively similar outcomes (Thatcher 2007) . Internationalization is analysed as technological, economic and policy/ideational developments which unsettle national spaces, but which are mediated by socio-economic distributional issues, efficiency of institutions' reform capability and state actors. Different national contexts and sectors will be affected differently by internationalization: liberal market economies may be more predisposed to embracing liberalization quickly and deeply than coordinated market ones, whilst technological change will tend to be stronger in some sectors than others (for instance, in telecommunications than electricity). Firm characteristics, such as size, existence of scale economies, and prior internationalization experience, may intervene in responses to liberalization and internationalization.
HYPOTHESES ON LIBERALIZATION AND INCUMBENT INTERNATIONALIZATION

Hypothesis three claims that governments and firms responded in various ways to liberalization, incumbent internationalization being one, and that this can be explained by country, sectoral and firm differences.
Testing these hypotheses is the central aim of this article. However, there are two secondary questions that require brief attention: ownership and firm size. Liberalization and privatization are conceptually different policies and, whilst the EC has competence in liberalization policy, it is up to national governments to implement privatization (Clifton et al. 2006 
A 'SNAPSHOT' OF RECENT INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EU TELECOMS AND ELECTRICITY INCUMBENTS
A sketch of the internationalization of major EU telecoms and electricity incumbents is briefly provided. Tables one and two 
ANALYSIS
The five hypotheses are now tested using correlation and cluster analysis techniques.
Results are divided into telecoms and electricity.
Telecoms
Correlation between variables using Pearson bivariate correlation, Kendall rank and Spearman rank correlation were used to detect the strength of association between internationalization and entry regulation, market structure, ownership, size (revenue and Cluster analysis is applied to detect patterns in incumbent internationalization, considering the same variables and time period as previously. The relationship between internationalization and entry regulation is first analysed (see the left side of Table   four ). In 1999, the most internationalized incumbents fell into two clusters. Firstly were those which internationalized strongly whilst entry regulation was liberalized, Fortum and Endesa (cluster four). E.ON, in contrast, stands out for aggressive internationalization in the context of low entry regulation liberalization. As in telecoms, the leader incumbent internationalizers emerged from contexts where liberalization is both less and more advanced. E.ON is reminiscent of Telefónica in its pursuit of ambitious internationalization from a relatively closed market. Most incumbents pursued cautious internationalization programmes in 1999. There were two similarlysized clusters of incumbents: cluster three where liberalization was more advanced, and cluster one where this was delayed. Included in cluster three were Spanish regional incumbents (Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa) and, in cluster one, German regional incumbents (RWE and EnBW). These Spanish and German incumbents had lower internationalization levels than Endesa and E.ON respectively. Therefore, even a national-sectoral approach cannot account for the variety of firm strategies. Ultimately, varieties of response are firm-level. Finally, most incumbents pursued internationalization slowly; only five of seventeen pursued internationalization enthusiastically in 1999.
Vertical integration is analysed on the right-hand side of Table four. Cluster one comprises incumbents which made above-average progress unbundling and where internationalization was stronger: Fortum, Endesa, E.ON and RWE. In common with telecoms, the vast majority of electricity incumbents internationalised slowly in 1999. In both sectors, only a minority of incumbents were strongly internationalised by 1999. Of the lesser internationalised incumbents, three fell into cluster two, where unbundling is progressing slowly; the bulk (eight) fall into cluster three, where unbundling is ongoing.
How did these incumbents evolve over the next seven years? Analysis is first turned to internationalization and entry regulation. As regards internationalization and vertical integration, the most internationalized of electricity incumbents are divided up nearly equally into two clusters, since, whilst entry regulation liberalization was nearly complete in 2006, progress on unbundling was mixed. First, there was a group of seven highly internationalised incumbents based in countries where unbundling was more advanced (cluster four). This included National
Grid, Scottish Power, Endesa, Unión Fenosa, Dong Energy and EVN. These incumbents were able to internationalise as both entry regulation and unbundling were implemented. Second, a group of six incumbents (cluster one) pursued significant internationalisation expansion, in a context of liberalised entry but delayed unbundling (E.ON, EDF, RWE, Vattenfall, EDP, and Fortum). The main exception was Electrabel, which had delayed both forms of liberalization. So, Finland's Fortum which, in 1999, seemed to be setting the pace for internationalization in the context of advanced liberalization, and saw its foreign revenues increase over seven years from 32% 73%, did so whilst unbundling stagnated. A similar observation can be made of the other cluster members. A third cluster, three, comprises three incumbents whose internationalization was slower in a context of greater progress unbundling. EnBW is alone in cluster two, enjoying higher vertical integration but less internationalization.
Here, it can be seen how Iberdrola and EnBW, operating in the same policy environment as their other highly internationalized Spanish and German peers, were much slower to internationalise. Again, diversity is beyond national and sectoral patterns -it is ultimately located at the firm level.
EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL PATTERNS IN TELECOMS AND ELECTRICITY
Regulatory reforms defined broadly as liberalization were a prerequisite for the rise of telecoms and energy Multinationals. The experience of incumbent internationalization shows that political economy approaches which predict firms will internationalize as an automatic response to earlier liberalization at home, or that firms will lobby a government to delay liberalization while aggressively going abroad, are over-deterministic. They may explain some experiences in Europe, but no such generalised patterns are observed. Instead, paths to incumbent internationalization are best understood by taking into account multiple layers of institutional differences: internationalization forces, country, sector and firm characteristics. Further research should enquire in depth the relative importance of the various institutional differences to explain internationalization outcomes. 
